In classical optimal foraging models long-term rate of energy intake (the ratio of expected amount of food over expected time) is assumed to be die maximized currency, because doing this is consistent with minimizing die loss of alternative opportunities. Here this possibility and various alternatives are examined quantitatively using European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) in the laboratory. The birds chose between two cues. One signaled an option Uiat led to either a fixed delay to food ("single standard," Experiment 1) or to one of two equally probable delays to food ("double standard," Experiments 2 and 3). The other cue signaled an "adjusting option" consisting of a single delay to food. This option adjusted according to the previous choices made by the birds, improving when the standard had been preferred and worsening when the adjusting option had been preferred. Adjustments were made either by changing the delay to food or the amount of food. The rationale underlying this procedure was that the parameter values at which the adjusting option stabilizes should reflect the subjective value of the standard. This was validated in Experiment 1. In Experiments 2 and 3 die adjusting option fluctuated around parameter values that are interpreted as yielding subjective equivalents of the double standard. The results contradict the predictions based on minimizing the lost opportunity. First, the birds did not include all the time intervals in their assignment of value to the two options, and second, die birds used die expected ratio of amount over time rather dian the ratio of expected amount over expected time as their rate currency. Key words: currency, European starling, optimal foraging, rate maximization. [Behav Ecol 7:341-352 (1996)] O ptimality models are built on die premise that the payoffs of different behavioral decisions can be expressed in a common "currency." Although the ultimate currency of all decisions must be Darwinian fitness, it is often assumed that organisms may use a proximate surrogate for fitness to guide their behavior in the short-term. This assumpdon is necessary to generate predictions that are testable using shortterm behavioral observations. In contrast to die descriptive models often used in psychology and economics, in which observed behavior is used to specify a currency (or utility) a posteriori, in evolutionary inspired foraging models the currency is postulated on the basis of reasoning about the fitness consequences of foraging. The currency assumed in the majority of existing foraging models is average net long-term rate of energy intake (for a review of these models see Stephens and Krebs, 1986) . This hypothesis has been justified on the grounds diat it combines three dimensions of importance (gains, losses, and time) in a sensible and simple manner. In diis article we test diis currency hypothesis against potential alternatives using European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) foraging in die laboratory.
O ptimality models are built on die premise that the payoffs of different behavioral decisions can be expressed in a common "currency." Although the ultimate currency of all decisions must be Darwinian fitness, it is often assumed that organisms may use a proximate surrogate for fitness to guide their behavior in the short-term. This assumpdon is necessary to generate predictions that are testable using shortterm behavioral observations. In contrast to die descriptive models often used in psychology and economics, in which observed behavior is used to specify a currency (or utility) a posteriori, in evolutionary inspired foraging models the currency is postulated on the basis of reasoning about the fitness consequences of foraging. The currency assumed in the majority of existing foraging models is average net long-term rate of energy intake (for a review of these models see Stephens and Krebs, 1986) . This hypothesis has been justified on the grounds diat it combines three dimensions of importance (gains, losses, and time) in a sensible and simple manner. In diis article we test diis currency hypothesis against potential alternatives using European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) foraging in die laboratory.
The average net long-term rate of energy intake for a foraging option is best estimated by the ratio of the expected net energy gained (G) over the expected time spent foraging (7). Thus long-term rate, or ratio of expectations (RoE) = -^- (i) where Gi is the energy gained from die zth food item, Ti is die time taken to acquire this item, and n is the total number of food items available in the option. The choice of long-term Received 23 January 1995; revised 3 July 1995; accepted 30 October 1995. 1045-2249/96/55.00 © 1996 International Society for Behavioral Ecology rate (or RoE) is justified on the grounds that, all else being equal, natural selection should favor animals that on average have a higher net energy gain during the time dedicated to foraging. Both the survival and reproduction components of fitness have an obvious relation to energy and time: the more food energy, the more energy available for reproduction, and the less time spent feeding, the more time available for other activities, such as predator avoidance and reproductive behavior. This is encapsulated in the principle of lost opportunity (Stephens and Krebs, 1986 ) diat identifies optimal choices by comparing the gains accrued from each possible choice with those that would accrue if the same time were to be devoted to an alternative.
Despite these persuasive arguments for long-term rate, an alternative rate currency for combining G and T has periodically been advocated, starting with an article entided, "The fallacy of the averages in ecological optimization theory" (Templeton and Lawlor, 1981) . The currency in question is the expected ratio of G over T, where, using die same definitions as above, expectation of Ratios (or EoR) = The expectation of die ratios (EoR) has been referred to by a number of names including few-prey-item maximization (Turelli et al., 1982) , per-patch rate (Stephens and Krebs, 1986) , and short-term rate (Real, 1991) . Since each of diese names may be questioned on different grounds, we prefer the more descriptive EoR. The crucial difference between longterm rate and EoR is diat in die latter the rates at which individual prey items are obtained are not weighted according to the time over which diis rate of intake is experienced. Thus, if there is no variability in T, then long-term rate and EoR give identical values. However, when Tis variable, for any set of values of G and T, it will be true that EoR is not equal to long-term rate, and diat for two options of equal long-term rate the one with the greater variance in Twill have the great-er EoR (Caraco et al., 1992) . Hence the so-called "fallacy of the averages," whose proponents point out that the average of a function of random variables is not equal to the function of the averages, and that foragers ought to maximize EoR rather than long-term rate as assumed in classical OFT (Templeton and Lawlor, 1981) . This proposal for the use of EoR was originally rejected on theoretical grounds because of the lack of an obvious link between maximization of this currency and fitness ("the fallacy of the fallacy of the averages" (GilHam et al., 1982; Possingham, et al., 1990; Turelli et al., 1982) . In essence, EoR violates the principle of lost opportunity.
In the psychological literature, however, currencies similar or identical to EoR have received support from a number of empirical studies (e.g., Mazur, 1984 Mazur, , 1986 McDiarmid and Rilling, 1965) . For example, Mazur (1984 Mazur ( , 1986 has found that pigeons choosing between a fixed and a variable delay to reward behave as would be predicted if they attribute value to the options according to the following equation:
where A is the immediate value of the food reward and D is the delay to receive it in seconds. There are three differences between die above expression and EoR. The first is the constant 1 added to die delay. This prevents the value becoming infinite when the delay is zero, altliough in practice this is unlikely to be a problem because a food item can never really take no time to obtain. The second is die constant K, a free parameter with units s" 1 diat varies between individuals, but was found by Mazur to be close to unity in pigeons. The final difference is that the D in Mazur's rule is not exactly equivalent to die T in EoR because it includes only the delay between die decision and reward and not odier time intervals in the foraging cycle such as die intertrial interval.
In the foraging literature theoretical debate related to die use EoR has been revitalized by the emergence of experimental data on starlings (Bateson and Kacelnik, 1995b; Cuthill et al., 1990), pigeons (Columba livia; Todd and Kacelnik, 1993) , and bumble bees (Bombus pennsylvaniciis, Harder and Real, 1987; Real et al., 1990) diat are compatible with maximization of EoR. The evidence comes from foraging experiments involving variance in T, in which the predictions of long-term rate and EoR maximization are different. In some such experiments the discrepancy between die observed behavior and the predictions of long-term rate maximizing can be explained if EoR is in fact the currency under maximization. For example, when given a choice of five units of food after a 20 s delay widi certainty (the fixed option) versus a delay that was eidier 2.5 s or 60.5 s widi equal probability (the variable option), starlings strongly preferred die variable option, despite die fact diat it gave die lower long-term rate of energy intake (Bateson and Kacelnik, 1995b) . We argued that diis result could be compauble widi maximization of EoR, since when valued in this currency die variable option offers a greater subjecdve value dian die fixed option. However, diis study does not represent a strong test of the EoR currency because odier theories predict die same qualitative preference. For example, both risk-sensidve foraging theory under negative energy budgets and time discounting due to unpredictable interruptions to foraging also predict a preference for die variable option (McNamara and Houston, 1987) , as does the Scalar Expectancy Theory (Bateson and Kacelnik, 1995b; Gibbon et al., 1988; Reboreda and Kacelnik, 1991) .
In diis article we use a design for which quantitative predictions for a variety of rate currencies can be made. Our rationale is based on the experiment described above (Bateson and Kacelnik, 1995b) , in which a variable delay to food was preferred over a fixed delay. We reasoned diat if die subjective value of the fixed option were increased, a point would be reached at which die two options would become subjectively equivalent in value. The fixed option could be improved eidier by increasing the amount of food delivered or by reducing the delay to receive food. The predicted points of subjective equality depend on the currency in which die options are valued, and they can dierefore be used to determine die currency used by die birds.
Points of subjective equality between the two options can be determined experimentally by establishing when subjects treat a fixed option as being equal in value to a variable option. We employ a procedure in which die fixed option is periodically modified in response to the birds' choices until it is chosen in an average of 50% of trials. This procedure involves presenting an animal with the two foraging options on response keys of different colors. The schedule programmed for one option, die "standard option," does not alter. The other, the "adjusting option," has a schedule diat is adjusted according to the previous preference of die animal: if die animal prefers the standard dien die value of one parameter of the adjusting option (die "adjusting parameter," either die delay to reward or the amount of reward) is modified so diat die subjective value of die adjusting option is increased, and if the animal prefers the adjusting option die opposite adjustment takes place. An increase in subjective value is achieved by a shorter delay to reward or a larger reward, and a decrease means the opposite in each case. After a few sessions the adjusting parameter is generally found to fluctuate around a stable value, which is interpreted as the value of diis parameter diat makes die adjusting option equivalent in subjective value to die standard.
GENERAL METHODS

Subjects
The subjects were six wild-caught, first-year European starlings (Sturnus vulgaris), housed individually in cages measuring 120 cm X 50 cm X 60 cm. Two mondis previously they had served in die choice experiment described by Bateson and Kacelnik (1995) . The birds were visually but not acoustically isolated. Temperature in die laboratory ranged between 7°C and 13°C, and die lights were on between 0600 h and 1800 h. The birds were food deprived from 1700 h until the start of each session at 0800 h die following morning. During die experimental sessions die birds were rewarded with turkey starter crumbs, and after die session the birds were given four mealworms and ad libitum turkey crumbs until 1700 h. This regime resulted in the birds being maintained at approximately 90% of their ad libitum feeding weights.
Apparatus
Each cage had an operant panel in the center of the back wall with two response keys (3.5 cm in diameter) at 6 cm on either side of a central food hopper. The food hopper was connected to a pellet dispenser (Campden Instruments) filled with turkey crumbs sieved to an even size. One unit of food averaged 0.012 g of turkey crumbs and took 1 s to deliver. A BBC Master microcomputer running SPIDER experimental control language (Paul Fray, Ltd.) controlled the stimulus events and response contingencies, as well as die recording of data. Since the birds were already familiar widi the apparatus and had been trained to peck illuminated keys to obtain food, no further training was required. The arrows indicate which parameter was titrated in the adjusting option. The question marks indicate the point subjective equality sought in each comparison. In the double standards (Experiments 2 and 3) the two delays to reward occurred with equal probability (indicated by "P=0.5").
Adjusting procedure
Colored lights on the pecking keys were used as die discriminative stimuli indicating die two options. For each bird, eidier die standard was cued by a green light and die adjusdng option by a red light or vice versa, such diat the assignment of colors to options was balanced across birds. Depending on die experiment, die standard was either a "single standard" (Experiment 1), diat consisted of a fixed delay to obtain a fixed amount of food, or a "double standard" (Experiments 2 and 3) diat consisted of two different delays programmed to occur widi equal probability to obtain a fixed amount of food. The values of die delays and amounts in the two options of each experiment are shown schematically in Table 1 . For all of die experiments we used die same basic procedure consisting of discrete trials widi a fixed intertrial interval (ITI) of 40 s. There were two types of trials, forced trials and choice trials. The forced trials allowed the birds to experience the two options and learn about their characteristics, while the choice trials tested die birds' preferences. A forced trial (see Figure 1 ) began with one of the key lights flashing (on for 0.7 s and off for 0.3 s). When die bird pecked die key die light changed from flashing to being continuously illuminated and a delay to receive die associated reward began. The first peck after diis delay had timed out extinguished die key light and caused die delivery of food to die hopper. The ITI started to time when food delivery was complete. The choice trials were identical to the forced trials with die exception diat a choice trial began widi bodi keys flashing, one in each color, and as soon as die bird pecked one of die keys it was illuminated continuously and die odier was extinguished (see Figure 1) . Thus a bird committed itself to one of the options widi its first peck.
An experimental session was composed of 12 blocks of 10 trials. Each block consisted of eight forced trials followed by two choice trials. The forced trials comprised four of each option given in a different randomly chosen order for each block, widi half of die trials of each type appearing on the left key and die odier half on die right (see Figure 2 ). This procedure was designed to ensure diat die birds had experienced bodi options an equal number of times before having to choose between them, and diat die adjusting option was experienced as invariable in die short term. The birds were given one session per day. When all of die birds had completed die session, generally at around noon, diey were given ad libitum food until 1700 h when diey were deprived for die night
In each experiment die adjusting parameter started at some extreme value (see mediods of individual experiments for details) and die birds were trained until diey completed one session widi at least a 90% preference in die choice trials for one of die options. When a bird reached diis criterion titration began. After each pair of choice trials die schedule for die subsequent block was altered as follows. If die bird chose die standard twice dien die value of die adjusting option became one step better (eidier 1 s shorter delay or 1 unit more food depending on die treatment), if a bird chose die adjusting option twice its value became one step worse (eidier 1 s longer delay or 1 unit less food depending on die treatment). If a bird chose each option once no change followed. Each new session began widi die adjusting option set at die value at which it finished in die previous session. The birds were run 7 days a week, and titration continued for a minimum of 22 sessions (264 blocks).
EXPERIMENT 1 Rationale and predictions
This experiment was designed to test whedier die adjusting procedure produced valid subjective equivalents in starlings. The strategy we adopted was to perform two titrations, one with amount and one widi delay as die adjusting parameter, in which die point of subjective equality could be unequivocally predicted. In both treatments we titrated against a single standard consisting of a delay of 20 s to obtain five units of food. In die amount treatment die adjusting option consisted of a 20 s delay to obtain an adjusting quantity of food, and in die delay treatment die adjusting option consisted of an adjusting delay to obtain five units of food (see Table 1 ). Thus, if die process of adjustment did not bias choice, die subjective equivalents derived from die adjusting parameter should be equal to die value of die same parameter in die standard option. In the amount treatment die mean value of die adjusting amount should be five units, and in die delay treatment die mean value of die adjusting delay should be equal to 20 s.
Methods
All six birds did both treatments; Birds 0, 1, and 2 did die titration widi amount followed by the titration widi delay, and Birds 3, 4 and 5 did die treatments in die reverse order. The adjusting parameter started out as 15 units of food in die amount treatment and as 5 s delay in die delay treatment All other details are as described for a titration against a single standard in die General Mediods section above.
Results and discussion
Statistics on the value of die adjusting parameter in die last 100 blocks of die amount and delay treatments are shown in Figures 3 and 4 respectively. In bodi treatments the value of die adjusting parameter fluctuated symmetrically (i.e., die Figure 1 The events in a forced trial (left) and a choice trial (right). The color of the lines indicates the state of the pecking keys, with white indicating that there is no light illuminated on the pecking key.
End of trial
Key light flashes mean and median of the data were similar) around the value of the same parameter in the standard. In the amount treatment the mean value of the adjusting amount across birds is 5.22 units, and the mean values obtained from each bird are not significantly different from the predicted value of five units (Wilcoxon one-sample test against a median of 5, T = 13.0, p = .675, two-tailed). Similarly, in the delay treatment the mean value of the adjusting delay across birds is 21.77 s, and the mean values obtained from each bird are not significantly different from the predicted delay of 20 s (Wilcoxon one-sample test against a median of 20, T = 14.0, p = .529, two-tailed). These results suggest that the adjusting procedure does not introduce a significant bias and thus it is a valid method for establishing points of subjective equality.
EXPERIMENT 2 Rationale and predictions
Having established that the adjusting procedure itself did not introduce any strong bias, we used it to find the value of the adjusting option subjectively equivalent to a double standard. Again there were two treatments. In both treatments the double standard consisted of a delay to obtain five units of food diat was delayed either 2.5 s or 60.5 s with equal probability.
In the amount treatment the adjusting option consisted of a 20 s delay to obtain an adjusting amount of food, while in the delay treatment it consisted of an adjusting delay to obtain five units of food. In both treatments the points of subjective equality predicted by long-term rate and EoR were calculated as described in the Appendix and are shown in Table 2 . As well as the basic predictions, we show the predictions that are made if the birds do not include all of the time intervals in the trial in dieir rate calculations, because although according to the logic of lost opportunity all time intervals of a foraging cycle (searching, chasing, handling etc.) have equal impact on future intake, they may not be equal in their subjective impact We shall return to this issue in the discussion.
Methods
All six birds did both treatments; Birds 0-2 did the delay titration followed by the amount titration, and Birds 3-5 did the titrations in the reverse order. In the amount treatment die adjusting amount began at five units of food and in the delay treatment the adjusting delay began at 20 s. In all other respects the methods are as described in the General Methods section for a titration against a double standard. When the titration in the delay treatment had been completed, the adjusting delay for each bird was set at the mean of the values that it had taken in the last 100 blocks of the titration (see Figure 5) , and the birds were given six sessions consisting entirely of choice trials. The value of the adjusting delay was not altered during these sessions. Thus, data were collected on 360 choices for each bird with the exception of Bird 2 that failed to complete the last 13 trials of the second session.
Results and discussion
Statistics on the value of the adjusting delay in the last 100 blocks of the delay treatment are shown in Figure 5 Eight forced trials, four of the standard option and four of the adjusting option with two of each type on each key. The order of these trials is randomly chosen for each block.
Two choice trials. The side on which each option appears is randomly chosen for each trial. Figure 2 The sequence of trials in a block. The icon represents the panel with two pecking keys and a central food hopper. The color of the pecking keys indicates the type of trial. White pecking keys are not illuminated and the other two colors represent the cues for the standard and adjusting options. the prediction made by EoR calculated with die delay time only (Wilcoxon one-sample test against a median of 4.80, T = 18.0, p = 0.142, two-tailed), but are significantly different from the predictions made by all of the other EoR and longterm rate currencies under consideration (Wilcoxon one-sample test against a median of 8.46 or greater, T = 0, p = .036, two-tailed).
Next block
In the final six sessions of choice trials die birds showed no consistent preference for either option. Birds 0-3 showed no significant preference, Bird 4 had a significant preference for the adjusting option, and Bird 5 had a significant preference for the double standard (binomial tests with a null hypothesis that the two options have an equal probability of being cho- Results from the delay treatment in Experiment 1. The bars show the mean + 1 standard deviation of the value of the adjusting delay in the last 100 blocks of the treatment for each bird; the stars show die median of the data. The dashed line shows the delay in the standard option. pretation that the adjusting procedure produces valid points of subjective equality between a fixed delay to food and a double standard. To summarize, the results from the delay treatment suggest that (all else being equal) starlings value foraging options using EoR rather than long-term rate, and that they do not include all of the time in the trial in their rate calculations. In the amount treatment, four out of six birds continued to prefer the double standard independendy of the amount of food available in the adjusting option, with the consequence that the value of die adjusting amount continued to increase. Eventually we removed these birds from the experiment before diey had completed the full 264 blocks. No analyses were performed on die data from the amount treatment. There are various possible explanations for die failure of the titrations to stabilize. A dieoretical possibility is diat the starlings learned to "cheat" the procedure by continuing to choose die less attractive option in die choice trials to increase the amount of food diey received in the forced trials. However, this seems unlikely because this requires sacrificing immediate payoff in choice trials in exchange for delayed gains later on, an unlikely behavior given what is known about animal choice. Furthermore, in the delay treatment and in Experiment 1 the same birds did not learn to do diis. An alternative interpretation takes into account die expected value at equilibrium. For die currency suggested by the results from the delay treatment, die predicted subjective equivalent in this treatment is reached when die adjusting option delivers approximately 21 units of food (see Table 2 ). The failure of the amount titrations to stabilize may have occurred because this amount of food may be too large for the starlings to eat at once, and dierefore it may be systematically underestimated. If this interpretation is correct die effect should disappear when die predicted equilibrium value is smaller. We examined this possibility in die following experiment.
EXPERIMENTS
Rationale and predictions
In diis experiment die values for die delays and amounts in die double standard were such diat the predicted points of subjective equality for all of die currencies lay widiin die bounds of what we knew die starlings could measure (i.e., about five units of food or less). The double standard consisted of a delay to obtain two units of food diat was either 5 s or 20 s widi equal probability. The adjusting option consisted of a 20 s delay to obtain an adjusting amount of food (see Table 1 ). The predicted points of subjective equality derived from die different currencies are given in Table 3 . Note diat die currency supported by the results of Experiment 2 (EoR with delay only) predicts diat the point of subjective equality should occur when die value of die adjusting amount is exacdy five units of food. For the calculation of these predictions see the Appendix.
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Methods
The adjusting option started with two units of food. In all other respects the methods are as described in the general methods for a titration against a double standard.
Results and discussion
The amount of food in the adjusting option now stabilized for all birds. Statistics on the value of the adjusting amount in the last 100 blocks are shown in Figure 6 . The value of the adjusting amount rose from its initial value of two units to fluctuate symmetrically around a mean value of 4.25 units. The points of subjective equality are not significantly different from the predictions of EoR with delay (Wilcoxon one-sample test against a median of 5.00, T = 1.00, p = .059, two-tailed) or with delay and feeding time (Wilcoxon one-sample test against a median of 4.64, T = 4.00, p = .208, two-tailed), but are significantly different from the other predictions of EoR and long-term rate (Wilcoxon one-sample test against a median of 2.32 or less, T = 21.0, p = .036, two-tailed). This result supports the view that starlings value foraging options using EoR rather than long-term rate, and that they do not include all of the time in the trial in their rate calculations.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our aim in this article was to elucidate the rate currency that starlings use to choose between feeding options that differ in the time taken to acquire food items and their energetic content. We discussed two alternative ways of computing a rate: long-term rate (the ratio of the expected amount over expected foraging time, or RoE), which is the most frequently used currency in optimal foraging models, and the expected ratio of amount over foraging time (or EoR), a currency without a priori evolutionary rationale, because it violates the principle of lost opportunity, but consistent with the foraging decisions made by animals in other experimental situations. These currencies make different predictions about the value a forager should assign to an option if there is variability in the time taken to acquire and consume food items. Results from experiments designed to test these predictions led to two main conclusions, both of which are at odds with the principle of lost opportunity: first, the starlings used the expected ratio of amount over time (EoR) rather than long-term rate (RoE), and second, they did not include all of the time intervals in the trial in their rate calculations.
Is the adjusting procedure a valid method?
We shall begin by discussing the validity of the procedure we used to obtain the above results. It is clear from Figures 3 to 6 that in all of the experiments the adjusting parameter fluctuated considerably around its mean value. We have analyzed the causes of this variation elsewhere (Bateson and Kacelnik, 1995a) . However, a question relevant to our claims in this article is whether, and if so how, this variation affects the theoretical predictions we have made for the different currencies. Our predictions are based on the assumption that the adjusting option has the same value as a food source yielding a fixed delay to obtain a fixed amount of food (see the Appendix); but given that the adjusting parameter shows considerable variation is this justified? We have three lines of argument that Long-term rate (delay and feeding and delay only) Long-term rate and EoR (all time)
Figure 6
Results from Experiment 3. The bars show the mean + 1 standard deviation of the value of the adjusting amount in the last 100 blocks of the treatment for each bird; the stars show the median of the data. The dashed lines show the predictions of the various currencies under consideration. The observed data are significantly different from all of these predictions with the exception of EoR calculated without the ITI or latency. support our interpretation. First, changes in the adjusting option occurred in small steps, widi each choice trial being preceded by a minimum of four experiences of the new value of the adjusting parameter. In another experiment, the behavior of starlings that experienced a sudden large transition in the length of the travel time to a patch reached a new asymptote in behavior after about six experiences of the new conditions (Cuthill et al., 1994) . If this result is generalized to our experiment, then at the time of each choice trial a bird's estimate of the value of the adjusting parameter should be close to the current value of this parameter. Second, the results from Experiment 1 show that the adjusting procedure produces the equilibrium parameters that would be expected if the birds perceive the adjusting option as fixed. Finally, at the end of the delay treatment of Experiment 2 we showed that the birds remained indifferent between the two options when the adjusting parameter was fixed at the point of subjective equality derived from the adjusting procedure. Thus, we believe there is sufficient evidence that die adjusting procedure produces valid points of subjective equality between a fixed and a variable option.
Why don't the birds include all of the time intervals in thencalculations?
Our result that the currency that the starling's behavior maximizes may not include the ITI or latency to peck is contrary to the predictions of the principle of lost opportunity. When a rate-maximizing forager commits itself to pursuing or consuming a given food item it trades off the average time that will be devoted to that food item against the value of the alternative foraging opportunities lost during this period. A measure of the opportunity lost when a particular foraging option is pursued is obtained by multiplying all of the time dedicated to the option by the average rate of gain in the environment as a whole. Therefore, a rate-maximizing forager should include die ITI in its calculations of the value of an option because this interval must be endured before another decision can be made. The lack of effect of the ITI in our experiments may seem surprising because in tests of patch models (such as the Marginal Value Theorem) the time interval between encountering patches affects the giving up time in a patch, as is predicted by the principle of lost opportunity (Kacelnik, 1984; Kacelnik and Todd, 1992) . However, from a psychological perspective our experiment is critically different from these latter experiments. In the patch problem die time to encounter a new patch (the travel) comes between the decision to leave the current patch and future reward, with the forager starting a travel interval by deciding to abandon die current patch. In contrast, die psychological impact of die ITI in our experiment may be less than that of a travel interval, because instead of occurring between the decision and food it comes after the food has been obtained in the chosen option, widi the consequence that at no point does the forager choose to enter die ITI. In support of diis argument, other studies in the psychological literature have demonstrated diat the impact of a time interval on choice is indeed dependent on whedier it comes before or after food (e.g., Green et al., 1981; Snyderman, 1983) . A possible explanation for diis apparendy suboptimal behavior is diat freely foraging animals never encounter the situation of being forced to wait after food has been obtained before die next decision can be made. If diis is die case, dien animals may have evolved only to pay attention to time intervals diat intervene between a decision and food. This remains an untested proposition.
Why do the birds use EoR rather than long-term rate?
The most important finding of our experiments is diat starlings behaved as if diey were maximizing EoR radier dian long-term rate. As well as fitting widi previous results from starlings and bumblebees, diis is consistent widi Mazur's finding diat pigeons maximize EoR calculated widiout die ITI, but it challenges die predictions derived from overall rate maximization. Before discussing die interpretation of die above result we shall consider whedier our data shed any light on two odier questions of currency currendy under consideration in die foraging literature. These are, first, whedier rate (energy over time) or alternatively "efficiency" (energy gained over energy spent) more accurately describes die currency maximized, and second, if it is rate diat is calculated, whedier it is gross or net rate of energy intake (e.g., Kacelnik, 1984 , SchmidHempel et al., 1985 Ydenberg et al., 1994) . In fact, our experiments do not address these issues because in bodi cases discriminating die hypodieses requires diat die birds have different metabolic rates during die different periods of die foraging cycle [see Kacelnik and Houston (1984) and die Appendix of diis article for proofs of diis statement regarding rate and efficiency, respectively]. In our experiments it is likely diat diere were no substantial differences in metabolic rate during die different periods of each trial, since die birds were not forced to fly during die ITIs as diey are in odier paradigms in the field (Kacelnik, 1984) and the laboratory (Cuthill, et al., 1994) . However, we focus our discussion on net rate maximizing because in situations where diere are differential metabolic costs the data support diis currency over eitiier gross rate maximizing or efficiency.
Our results agree qualitatively but disagree quantitatively widi some explanations for why animals prefer a variable delay to reward over a fixed delay equal to die aridimetic mean of die variable mixture. The first such explanation we shall consider is Scalar Expectancy Theory (SET) (Brunner el al., 1992; Gibbon et al., 1988) . By combining assumptions about die processing of information relating to time intervals (and possibly also amounts of food) widi functional considerations, SET accounts well for die behavior seen in a number of different foraging experiments [see Bateson and Kacelnik (in press) and Brunner et al. (1992) for examples in starlings]. SET normally assumes that time intervals are remembered with constant relative error, diat die memory for each foraging option is formed as die aggregate of total experience of it, and diat decisions are taken by taking a single sample from die memory for each option. It follows from diese assumptions diat subjective equality between a two-valued variable delay (in our case die double standard) and a fixed delay (in our case die adjusting option) should occur when die delay in die fixed option is equal to die geometric mean (in our case V2.5*60.5 = 12.30 s) of die two delays in die variable option [see Bateson and Kacelnik (1995b) for proof], whereas in this experiment subjective equality was found at die harmonic mean, (V 2 ('4s + )'' = 4.80 s, which is equivalent to die EoR prediction. We do not believe that diis quantitative discrepancy is fatal to die SET framework. Radier, we believe diat modifications will be needed in die assumptions made about eidier die representation of delays in memory or dieir subsequent recall in order for a model in die SET framework to explain this result (e.g., Brunner et al., 1994) .
A second set of models qualitatively compatible widi our results are those based on die risks of interruption during foraging. According to diis view, a delayed reward has a lower expected value dian a more immediate one because it has a greater chance of being lost during die extra delay (e.g., Kagel et al., 1986; McNamara and Houston, 1987) . A variety of models have been proposed that predict different shaped discounting functions, but all of which predict that a variable delay to food should be valued more highly than a fixed delay with the same arithmetic mean value. Original predictions based on a constant probability of loss per unit time lead to exponential discounting, which is not compatible with EoR. However, newer post-hoc theoretical models predict hyperbolic discounting, which is compatible with EoR. Although these latter versions of discounting could accommodate our EoR result, there is a different reason for rejecting explanations based on the probability of interruption. Our birds were kept under continuous reinforcement for many days during the experiments, experiencing thousands of trials that always ended in reward. Under these conditions it would be curious if the birds failed to learn that the probability of interruption was zero. In order to salvage the interruption view, it could be argued diat animals may be preprogrammed to behave as if interruptions are always possible because this is the case in the natural environment of the starling, but this is contradicted by evidence showing that birds can learn that reinforcement is probabilistic when this is the case (e.g., Catania and Reynolds, 1968) . Thus, time discounting due to probability of reward loss does not provide a parsimonious explanation for our results or, indeed, for the many observations of hyperbolic discounting in continuous reinforcement laboratory conditions.
This section of the discussion would not be complete without mentioning risk-sensitive foraging theory. It has been shown theoretically that a bird on a negative energy budget minimizing its probability of overnight starvation should prefer an option that is variable in the predicted delay to obtain food over one that offers a fixed delay of the same average length (McNamara and Houston, 1992; Zabludoff et al., 1988) . A preference for variability in our titration would lead to equilibrium, with the fixed alternative shorter dian the arithmetic mean of the variable one, as we obtain. However, we cannot offer a precise test of this hypothesis because a quantitative prediction of the level of the preference (and thus of the point of equality) depends on the value of parameters that are impossible to estimate, and which (as with the interruption analysis) would not apply to the laboratory conditions. However, the risk-sensitive approach predicts that if some of these conditions are modified, the reverse preference should be observed, and to date diere have been no demonstrations that the probability of preferring a variable or fixed delay (as opposed to amount) is influenced by energy budget as predicted by the risk-sensitive models (Ha, 1991; Ha etal., 1990) .
In an attempt to present some plausible explanations for EoR maximization we shall begin by clarifying the difference between EoR and long-term rate. Although we initially presented long-term rate and EoR as discrete currencies, they could be seen as two extreme points on a plane of possibilities described by two parameters: the total number of prey items remembered by the forager, n, and the size of the frame over which the forager computes the rate,/ Under this view, both long-term rate and EoR are specific cases of a general expression for rate where
When n is large and/= n this converges on long-term rate, and when n is large and/= 1 it converges on EoR. If we use our current knowledge about starlings from a variety of different paradigms it would appear that the currency that best describes their choices is Equation 4 with n = 6 (Cuthill et al., 1994) and/= 1 (e.g., this article). Note that the discrepancy between long-term rate and EoR lies in the frame size, f, rather than in the total amount of information on which the forager bases its assessment of value, n (see Table 4 for a numerical illustration of this). In fact, Equation 4 does not cover all of the plausible forms of averaging foraging experience because it implies that the last n events have equal weight in the forager's decision. In reality animals are more likely to use some type of moving weighted average in which more recendy experienced events have a larger impact on the rate computed.
We shall discuss two categories of explanations for EoR, some based on optimizing under information processing constraints and others based on unconstrained optimality. The first constraint-based explanation is the neuroeconomic argument made for bumblebees by Real (1991) . The idea is that information about rate of intake from each flower visited will be more efficiendy stored as a single value, rather dian as amounts and times to be processed separately. This assumes that the amount gained and time spent acquiring each item are perceived, or at least stored, direcdy as dieir ratio, C/T. Thus, each food item gives one estimate of rate of gain in the environment, rather than one estimate of gain per item and one of time taken per item. If foragers were forced to do this because of a neural constraint, computing EoR would be die only available approximation of the long-term rate because independent information about expected times and expected amounts per item would not be available. Evidence against diis explanation in starlings comes from die patterns of key pecking during die delays to food. Peaks of pecking rate at die appropriate times show diat diey possess information about the possible delays to food in each of the options independent of die rate of intake provided by die option (Bateson and Kacelnik, 1995b) . If EoR maximization is to be explained by constraints on die amount of memory available, it seems inconsistent diat animals do remember diis information but do not seem to use it to make foraging choices. However, a different neuroeconomic argument might still be made by arguing diat it is possible that die constraint is not die amount of storage space available, but die relative ease of computing EoR versus long-term rate.
A second constraint-based explanation for EoR maximization arises from the fact diat as the value of n approaches one in Equation 4 the two rate currencies calculated widi j= n and/= 1 converge on die same value, providing a poor instantaneous estimate of eidier currency because of being based on a small sample. Over a relatively long foraging period, die average of die instantaneous estimates will be equivalent to Equation 4 widi a large n and /= 1, namely to die EoR experienced during die period. Thus if animals are constrained to use very short memory windows dien diis could explain why diey appear to maximize EoR. There is evidence diat bees may use a memory window of only one or two experiences, which Real et al. (1990) have used to explain why they maximize EoR. Given diat the use of very short memory windows might give mechanistic support for die EoR result, we shall now examine if our starlings may have been using a one-event memory.
Let us consider what a one-event memory would generate in the delay treatment of Experiment 2. In the forced trials die subject experiences D^ in die adjusting option and either D^ or Dfy (see nomenclature in Table 4 ) in die double standard. We can predict equilibrium in die titration by considering cases when D^ takes different values. An animal remembering only its last experience of each option would base All of the rates are based on the same 12 prey items (n = 12). Each item has a gain (G) and time (T) associated with it (here these are random numbers). The average rate experienced for the 12 items depends on the frame (/) over which gains and times are summed before a rate is computed. The table shows the calculations for six different frame sizes. Each box of the table represents a frame; its boundaries indicate which prey items it spans. The three numbers in each box are the sum of G for the frame (top), the sum of Tfor the frame (middle), and the ratio of these two sums (bottom). The average rate obtained for each frame size is displayed in the right-hand column of the table. Note that if/= 12 (i.e.,/= n) then the resulting average rate is equal to the long-term rate (RoE), and if/= 1 then the resulting average rate is equal to the expectation of the ratios (EoR). This example serves to demonstrate that the discrepancy between longterm rate and EoR is due to occasional small values of T (as in the case of item 5), which have a particularly large impact on the average rate when / = 1.
the first of the two choices in each block on the most recent forced trials, whereas the second of the two choices will also be influenced by what is experienced as a result of the first choice. When D^ < D^, regardless of whether the last forced trial of the double standard was D^ or D hv both choices will be for the adjusting option. Due to this biased choice, in the next block, D^ will be longer, but it will continue to be chosen until D^ > Dj^. Contingencies in the range D^ < D^ < D^ are more complicated: in one-quarter of the pairs of choices the standard will be preferred twice (when the last forced trial gave D^ and the first choice yielded D^, in another quarter the first choice will be for the standard and the second for the adjusting option (when the last forced trial gave D^ and the first choice yielded D^), and in the remaining half the adjusting option will be chosen twice (when the last forced trial gives D^ and the first choice thus yields D^). Thus on average D^ increases twice as often as it decreases, until it reaches D lng . When D MJ > D lns all choices will be for the standard and D^ will therefore decrease. In summary, if choices were based on a memory for the last event in each option the value of the adjusting option would fluctuate around D^ (60.5 s in our experiment), which is very far from the empirical result we obtained (mean of 5.61 s). This means that our subjects were definitely not using a one-event memory. Although our data are incompatible with a memory of a single event, it is worth emphasizing that there are conditions, different from our experimental situation, under which using such a short memory would actually be the long-term rate maximizing policy. This happens when successive instances of a mixture do not occur independently because of serial correlation in the environment. If, for instance, short and long delays came in bouts, then the subjects could experience a rate higher than that expected from the arithmetic mean of the two delays, because they could use the last event to predict the outcome of the next one, preferring the variable option when it is more likely to give a short than a long delay (Cuthill et al., 1990; Real, 1991) . This idea must be considered here for completeness, because if the natural environment was serially correlated and the birds had acquired a rigid mechanism of using only the last event, they may follow this strategy in situations where there is no serial correlation, such as ours. This is a sound argument for the possibility of an unconstrained advantage for single-event memory in some special situations, but it can be dismissed in our experiments because the previous analysis has shown that the birds were not using the last event only.
Given that there are currently no plausible arguments for why maximizing EoR should result in higher fitness than maximization of long-term rate, we shall now examine the possibility that under natural circumstances there is no advantage of computing one over the other. In our experiment we chose a double standard with one very small and one very large value of Tto exaggerate the discrepancy in the predictions of the long-term rate and EoR. The example in Table 4 makes it clear that small values of T have a larger impact on EoR than on long-term rate. However, long-term rate and EoR are identical if there is no variation in T, and in fact, as long as the distribution of T does not contain very small values, the discrepancy in energetic intake between EoR and long-term rate will be small. In this situation natural selection would be neutral with respect to whether rates are calculated using EoR or long-term rate if the only fitness consequences of the currencies are measured in terms of energetic intake. This idea Note that the feeding time, F, is always equal to the amount of food, A, because one unit of food took exactly 1 s to deliver.
could be tested by measuring the distribution of Tfor foragers in their natural environment and calculating whether or not there is a significant discrepancy between long-term rate and EoR (see Bateson and Whitehead, in press ).
In conclusion, we have shown laboratory evidence that foraging choices in the starling are based on a currency (EoR), for which we see no obvious functional advantage. What are the implications of this for optimal foraging theory? It is possible that foraging theory, while remaining the most quantitatively precise field for the study for animal decision making, may be too narrow for our level of analysis. Functional modeling of foraging decision making may have to incorporate mechanistic factors such as the computational demands of implementing alternative algorithms.
APPENDIX
This appendix describes how the predictions given in Tables  2 and 3 were calculated. The definitions of the terms used in the equations are given in Table 5 If the starlings are using long-term rate (RoE) computed with all of the time intervals to value the two options, then the adjusting option will be equivalent to the double standard when the long-term rate in the adjusting option is equal to the long-term rate in the standard, that is, 2A U 2I+2L + A* + D^+2F, ln Whereas, if the starlings are using the expectation of the ratios (EoR) computed with all of the time intervals to value the options, then the adjusting option will be equivalent to the double standard when the EoR in the adjusting option is equal to the EoR in the double standard, that is,
Efficiency is an alternative currency to rate defined as the ratio of energy gained to energy spent. Assuming that metabolic rate is constant during foraging, efficiency can be expressed as follows:
A -mT A efficiency = --= --1 (A3) ml ml
where A is the gross amount of food gained, T is the time spent foraging, and m is the metabolic rate. Just as for rate, efficiency can be calculated either in the long-term or as an EoR, If the starlings use long-term efficiency to value the options, then the adjusting option will be equivalent to the double standard when the long-term efficiency in the adjusting option is equal to the long-term efficiency in the standard, that is, Again the ms cancel leaving the above equation identical to Equation A2. Therefore, in the experiments described in this article, die predictions based on rate are identical to those based on efficiency.
In the delay treatment of Experiment 2, the only value in Equations Al and A2 that is not fixed is that of D^ since this is the value obtained from the titrations. Thus, by solving Equations Al and A2 for D^ we can calculate die value of D^ predicted if the birds are using each of the rate currencies. Similarly, in the amount treatment of Experiment 2 and in Experiment 3, the only value not fixed is that of A^ since this is the value obtained from the titrations. Thus, by solving Equations Al and A2 for A^ we can calculate the value of Aw, predicted if die birds are using each of the rate currencies.
Since the latency to peck, L, is controlled by the birds, we had to make some assumption about its length in order to make die predictions that include L in the calculations. For die predictions in Tables 2 and 3 we used an arbitrary value of 1 s for L. To compute the predictions widiout the intertrial interval, latency, or feeding time, we solved the same equations omitting the terms /, L, and F as appropriate.
For example, in the delay treatment of Experiment 2 the adjusting delay, D^ predicted by maximization of EoR computed with delay and feeding time only is calculated as follows. The values programmed in the experiment are substituted into Equation A2, which is then solved to give D5 1 2\2.5 + 5 60.5 + 5 = 8.46.
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